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REASONABLE SUSPICION AND PROBABLE CAUSE
IN AUTOMOBILE SEARCHES: A VALIDITY
CHECKLIST FOR POLICE, PROSECUTORS, AND
DEFENSE ATTORNEYS
In United States v. Ross,1 the Supreme Court held that when police
legitimately stop a vehicle and have probable cause to believe the vehi-
cle contains contraband, the police can conduct a warrantless vehicle
search that is as thorough as a magistrate could authorize by a warrant.2
After Ross, the legitimacy of a warrantless vehicle search depends upon
whether police have a reasonable suspicion' to stop the vehicle4 and
456 U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982).
Id. at 2159, 2170-72.
See 102 S. Ct. at 2159, 2168 n.22, 2172; see also infra text accompanying notes 17-60
(discussion of reasonable suspicion). In United States v. Ross, an informant's tip, supported
by police observance of a vehicle and an individual described by the informant, provided
police with a reasonable suspicion to believe that the driver was engaged in drug traffick-
ing. 102 S. Ct. at 2160. The informant in Ross reported observing an individual selling nar-
cotics and statbd that more drugs were in the trunk of a parked vehicle. Id. From the infor-
mant's detailed descriptions, police recognized the defendant and his automobile. Id. The of-
ficers ran computer checks on both the defendant and the automobile to ascertain the ac-
curacy of the informant's descriptions. Id.
' See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925). In Carroll, the Supreme Court
established the automobile exception to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement. Id.
at 149, 153-56. The Carroll Court held that a vehicle's mobility provides an exigent circum-
stance justifying a warrantless search. Id. at 153. The Supreme Court expanded the auto-
mobile exception in Chambers v. Maroney to allow warrantless searches even when circum-
stances indicate that a vehicle is not mobile. See 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970) (once police establish
probable cause to search vehicle, warrantless search is valid at scene of stop or at police sta-
tion); Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67, 68 (1975) (warrantless search of vehicle exclusively within
police custody valid even though police waited one hour after impounding vehicle to search);
see also Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967) (valid warrantless search of vehicle im-
pounded under forfeiture proceedings for narcotics violation); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413
U.S. 433, 437-43 (1973) (valid warrantless search of vehicle involved in accident and in police
custody); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 375-76 (1976) (valid warrantless search of
vehicle impounded for parking violations).
An individual's reduced privacy in a vehicle also presents justifications for allowing
warrantless vehicle searches. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2171
(1982) (individual's privacy interests diminish in vehicle). Three reasons for an individual's
reduced expectations of privacy in a vehicle have evolved from Supreme Court automobile
exception decisions. See Katz, Automobile Searches and Diminished Expectations in the
Warrant Clause, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 557, 570 (1982) (discussion of justifications for
automobile exception). First, people use automobiles for transportation on public roads
where the automobile's occupants and contents are in plain view. See Cardwell v. Lewis,
417 U.S. 583, 590-91 (1974) (vehicle and its occupants are open to public scrutiny). Second, an
automobile seldom serves as a repository for personal effects. See id. (individuals generally
do not store personal effects in vehicle). Finally, the government extensively regulates
vehicles. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 440-42 (1973) (officers have more contact
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whether police have probable cause5 to search the vehicle.' Before Ross,
the Court held that police could not search a container during a war-
rantless vehicle search unless the container revealed its contents to public
view.' The Court had reasoned that police could not search a container that
concealed its contents from pulic view8 because the container's owner ex-
pected the contents to remain private.' The Ross Court, however, stated
that the fourth amendment's protection against warrantless searches"°
with vehicles because states require vehicle registration, operator licenses, and operation
regulation).
' See United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2163 n.8, 2171-72 (1982); see also infra
text accompanying notes 61-111 (discussion of probable cause). In United States v. Ross,
police stopped Ross after receiving information that Ross was involved in ongoing drug traf-
ficking and that his automobile contained narcotics. 102 S. Ct. at 2160, 2168 n.22. Police
verification of an informant's description of Ross and the vehicle provided probable cause to
search Ross's automobile. Id.
' See 102 S. Ct. at 2159, 2172 (Ross requirements for valid warrantless vehicle search).
' See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 424-29 (1981) (overruled by United States v.
Ross, 456 U.S. - (1982)). In Robbins v. California, the Supreme Court held that unless a
closed container in an automobile reveals its contents to plain view, the fourth amendment
protects the container from a warrantless search. 453 U.S. at 428-29. The Robbins Court
limited a warrantless search of a container found in a vehicle because the container's owner
had constitutionally protected expectations of privacy that the container's contents would
remain concealed from public view. Id. at 426-28; see infra text accompanying note 9 (discus-
sion of owner's privacy expectations in closed, opaque containers).
' See infra text accompanying notes 98-110 (discussion of plain view doctrine).
' See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. at 428 (fourth amendment protects owner's
privacy expectations in container that conceals contents); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 351-52 (1967). In Katz, the Supreme Court held that the fourth amendment protects
whatever an individual places inside a container when the container does not expose its con-
tents to public scrutiny. Id. The Katz Court also held, however, that the fourth amendment
does not protect items that an individual knowingly exposes to plain view. Id. at 351. The
Court stated that the fourth amendment protects a person from unreasonable police
searches and seizures whenever a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. at
352-53. Before Katz, the Court relied on property law to define protected areas and to deter-
mine whether a search unreasonably invaded a protected area. See Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 464-66 (1928) (overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353
(1967)) (discussion of "property law approach" to fourth amendment protection against war-
rantless searches). The Olmstead Court required a physical trespass before a search was
unreasonable under the fourth amendment. Id. at 466. In Olmstead, the Supreme Court
upheld a warrantless telephone tap because the telephone projected words outside the
defendant's home. Id. The Court found no illegal search and seizure because there was no
physical invasion into the defendant's home. Id.; see Note, From Private Places to Personal
Privacy: A Post-Katz Study of Fourth Amendment Protection, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 968,
971-78 (1968) (discussion of change of emphasis from property rights to privacy rights in
warrantless search cases).
1 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and




Generally, a search is per e unreasonable unless conducted pursuant to a warrant sup-
ported by probable cause. See United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). Although a
warrantless search is per se unreasonable, the Supreme Court has established thirteen ex-
ceptions to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement:
(a) Inventory search of vehicle- When police have lawfuly impounded or
seized a vehicle police may conduct a routine, warrantless search to inventory the
vehicle's contents. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428"U.S. 364, 375-76 (1976)
(warrantless search of impounded automobile's interior and glove box valid); Cady
v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 448 (1973) (warrantless search of trunk of seized
automobile valid).
(b) Hot pursuit-Police may follow a suspect into a building and search the
building without a warrant to find the suspect. See United States v. Santana, 427
U.S. 38, 42-43 (1976) (emergency pursuit of suspect by police may begin in public
place and extend to private place); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-300 (1967)
(exigencies of circumstance may provide police reasonable entry into house
entered by armed suspect).
(c) Border and customs searches -Government officials may search a per-
son and his property at an international boundary without probable cause. See
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272-75 (1973) (national self-
protection justifies warrantless searches at international borders); United States
v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 376 (1971) (customs agents may seize
illegal materials without search warrant).
(d) Highly regulated business -Government officials can search regulated
businesses during business hours. See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311,
316-17 (1972) (warrantless search of firearms dealership to inspect records valid);
see also infra note 113 (warrantless search of business based on implied consent
valid).
(e) Stop and frisk-Police may stop a person suspected of committing a
crime, pat the person's outer clothing, and reach inside clothing to seize an object
believed to be a weapon. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968) (warrantless
pat-down of person questioned by police valid); infra text accompanying notes
19-28 (discussion of Terry).
(f) Abandoned property-Police may conduct a warrantless search of prop-
erty reasonably assumed abandoned. See Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217,
240-41 (1960) (warrantless search of wastepaper basket after suspect vacated hotel
valid because suspect had abandoned basket's contents).
(g) Emergency aid-Police may enter and search a building without a
search warrant to find persons in need of immediate aid. See Mincey v. Arizona,
437 U.S. 385, 392 n.7 (1978) (fourth amendment does not bar police from making
warrantless entries and searches when person is in need of immediate aid).
(h) Consent-Police may search a person's property with the person's
voluntary permission. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973)
(warrantless automobile search conducted with voluntary consent of owner valid);
Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 628 (1946), rev'd on other grounds, 330 U.S. 800
(1946) (consent to examine business documents waives fourth amendment protec-
tions); infra text accompanying note 113 (discussion of consent).
(i) Plain view and open fields-Police do not need a warrant to search and
seize an item inherently criminal in nature that is found if police are lawfully on
the premises where the search occurs. See Air Pollution Variance Bd. of Western
Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861, 865 (1974) (fourth amendment protections do not ex-
tend to pollution seen from field); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58-59 (1924)
(moonshine seen by revenue officers 50 yards away is not search). But see infra
note 99 (discussion of plain view discovery of evidence in search and nonsearch cir-
cumstances).
(j) Fire and homicide investigations-Fireman may enter a building
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varies in particular settings." The Ross Court allowed the search of a con-
tainer found inside a vehicle 2 because society's interests in crime preven-
tion outweigh an individual's privacy expectations. 3
The Ross Court held that the privacy expectations of individuals oc-
cupying a vehicle diminish when police legitimately stop the vehicle and
have probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband."' After
without a search warrant to fight a fire and may remain briefly in the building
to investigate the cause of the fire. See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 511 (1978)
(firemen may later re-enter building after fire extinguished). Police at the scene of
a homicide or other major felony briefly may search the area for victims and the
felon. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392-93 (1978) (police may enter apart-
ment for initial emergency search following homicide report).
k) Detention facilities -Prison and jail officials may search prisoners and
cells at any time. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 555-59 (1979) (strip searches
and body cavity searches of prisoners do not violate fourth amendment); Lanza v.
New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143-45 (1962) (warrantless monitoring of prisoner's con-
versations does not violate fourth amendment).
(1) Search incident to arrest -Police do not need a search warrant to search
an arrestee and the area within the arrestee's immediate control. See New York
v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 457-63 (1981) (warrantless search of a vehicle's passenger
compartment, glove compartment, or of jacket found inside the passenger com-
partment does not violate fourth amendment); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218, 235-36 (1973) (warrantless search of cigarette pack in arrestee's pocket does
not violate fourth amendment); Chimmel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969)
(warrantless search of arrestee's entire house does violate fourth amendment).
(m) Vehicles -Police may search a vehicle without a warrant upon probable
cause that the vehicle contains contraband. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132, 149, 153-56 (1925) (warrantless vehicle searches do not violate fourth amend-
ment because vehicle's mobility provides exigent circumstances); supra note 4
(discussion of development of automobile exception).
Note, Automobile Container Searches: On the Road to Brighter Law? Robbins v. California
and New York v. Belton (December 12, 1981) (unpublished manuscript on file with Law
Review office).
" Id. at 2171. In United States v. Ross, the Supreme Court held that an individual's
privacy interests must yield to a magistrate's determination of probable cause to search a
container which may contain the object of the search. Id. The Ross Court further held that
when police have probable cause to search, prior approval of a magistrate is unnecessary.
Id. at 2172. The scope of a warrantless container search based on probable cause is
equivalent to the scope of a container search pursuant to a warrant supported by probable
cause. Id.
"I See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2172-73 (1982); see also
supra text accompanying note 4 (discussion of automobile exception to fourth amendment's
warrant requirement).
3 See United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2171 (1982); supra note 10 (discussion of
exemptions to fourth amendment's warrant requirement). The Ross Court explained that in
exceptional situations, such as a customs search or a search incident to arrrest, police may
search a container carried by an individual without a warrant. 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2171. Absent
an exception to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement, police must have probable
cause to search a container whether with or without a warrant. Id.; see infra text accompa-
nying notes 61-111 (discussion of probable cause).
" See United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2171-72 (1982) (individual's privacy expect-




Ross, police, prosecutors, and defense attorneys in warrantless vehicle
search cases no longer must consider whether an individual had constitu-
tionally protected privacy interests in a container found inside a
vehicle.15 Instead, police, prosecutors and defense attorneys must con-
sider whether a vehicle stop is legitimate and whether probable cause
exists to search the vehicle for contraband. 6
For police to legitimately stop a vehicle, an officer must have a
reasonable suspicion that an individual in the vehicle is violating or has
violated the law." A reasonable suspicion is a suspicion that would
justify a reasonably prudent man in like circumstances to believe that
danger threatens his or others' safety. 8 Reasonable suspicion to stop a
vehicle arises when a police officer recognizes specific, articulable facts,
and inferences from those facts, that justify an officer's intrusion upon
an individual's privacy to investigate a possible violation of the law. 9
In Terry v. Ohio,' the Supreme Court presented a two-part inquiry
for determining when a police officer reasonably can stop an individual
and investigate suspicious activity.1 In Terry, two men attracted a
15 See Latzer, Searching Cars and Their Contents: United States v. Ross, 18 CRIM. L.
BULL. 381, 400-05 (1982) (Ross exchanges individual privacy considerations for more certain
standard for permitting warrantless search of vehicles and containers inside).
"C See infra text accompanying notes 17-60 (discussion of reasonable suspicion to stop
vehicle); infra text accompanying notes 61-111 (discussion of probable cause to search vehi-
cle).
,, See United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2163 n.8, 2168 n.22, 2172 (1982) (legitimate
reasonable suspicion that automobile contains narcotics permits officer to stop vehicle); see
also infra text accompanying notes 18-35 (discussion of reasonable suspicion necessary for
an officer legitimately to stop a vehicle).
" See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1967). In Terry, the Supreme Court considered the
requirements for reasonable suspicion to permit an officer to stop and frisk an individual on
the street. Id. at 20. The Terry Court stated that an officer need not have probable cause to
arrest an individual, nor must the officer be certain an individual is carrying a weapon, to
make an investigatory stop. Id. at 22. Although reasonable suspicion requires that an officer
must have a reasonable belief that danger threatens himself or others, probable cause re-
quires that an officer must have knowledge based upon articulable facts that support a
reasonable belief that a crime is being committed or has been committed. See Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 172-76 (1949) (definition of probable cause). The Terry Court
emphasized that a reasonable stop and search of an individual is necessary to protect police
when an officer believes an individual is armed. 392 U.S. at 27. Another possible justifica-
tion for allowing police to make an investigatory stop may be to prevent officers from hav-
ing to choose between dereliction of duty, by refraining from making an investigatory stop,
and risk of death, by stopping an individual without being able to search for weapons. See
New York v. Earls, 431 U.S. 943, 948-49 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting to denial of cer-
tiorari).
"' See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-22 (1967) (establishing standard for determining
when a police officer has reasonable suspicion to stop an individual to investigate possible
criminal activity).
392 U.S. 1 (1967).
21 Id. at 19-20. In determining the reasonableness of a stop, the Supreme Court in
Terry considered the nature and extent of the interests involved. Id. at 22. The Terry Court
cited effective crime prevention and detection, a policeman's safety, danger to the public,
1983]
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police officer's attention because the men paced back and forth in front
of a store and repeatedly gazed into the store's window.22 The officer
stopped the men because of a suspicion that the two were "casing" the
store for a robbery.' The officer frisked one of the men and found a
pistol.24 The Terry Court upheld the officer's stop." First, the Terry
Court held that for a police officer to make a legitimate investigatory
stop, the officer first must suspect illegal conduct before the officer
takes any action." Second, the Court held that the officer's action must
relate reasonably in scope to the circumstances justifying the officer's
initial interference.' Consequently, the Terry Court held that the officer
reasonably stopped the men because their suspicious behavior justified
the officer's belief of possible criminal activity occurring.'
The Supreme Court applied the Terry reasonable suspicion standard
to an investigatory stop of a vehicle's driver in Adams v. Williams.' In
Adams, a tip from a reliable informant gave a police officer reasonable
suspicion to stop a -lriver because police suspected that the driver's
parked vehicle contained narcotics and a gun." The officer in Adams
recognized the described vehicle while patrolling a high-crime area at
2:15 a.m."' The policeman reached through the driver's open window and
found a revolver in the driver's belt, exactly where the informant had in-
dicated.2 The Adams Court held that information provided by another
person, as well as by an officer's personal observation, can supply
and intrusion on individual rights as interests involved in allowing police to stop and frisk a
person. Id. at 22-27.
Id. at 6. In Terry, two men each made five or six trips in front of a store, pausing to
look into the store each time they walked past. Id. After making several trips, the two men
conferred with a third man. Id.
Id. In Terry, a policeman approached three men he suspected of casing a store for a
possible robbery. Id. The officer asked the men for names, but received mumbled replies. Id.
at 7. The officer then grabbed Terry and frisked him. Id.
24 Id. at 7.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 20. The Terry Court found that an officer reasonably stopped three men
because the men's actions justified the officer's belief that the men were armed for robbery.
Id. at 28. Accordingly, the officer had to make a quick decision to protect himself and others
from possible danger. Id.
' Id. at 20, 29. In Terry, the scope of an officer's stop and frisk of three men suspected
of carrying weapons consisted of patting down the men's outer clothing. Id. Upon feeling a
weapon, the policeman removed guns from two of the men's overcoats. Id. at 7. The Court
held that the policeman confined himself to a minimal search to find and remove weapons.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 30-31.
407 U.S. 143, 144-47 (1972).
Id. at 144-45. In Adams v. Williams, a know informant approached a police cruiser in
a high crime area and told an officer that an individual in a nearby vehicle had narcotics and
a gun. Id.
31 Id.
' Id. at 145.
[Vol. 40:361
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reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle's driver.3 The Court explained
that once a policeman has a reasonable suspicion to fear for his safety, he
legally can insure his own safety by making a limited intrusion upon a
vehicle's driver.' The Adams Court held that the informant's tip,
verified by the officer's observation of the described vehicle parked in a
high crime area early in the morning, plus legitimate safety considera-
tions, supported the policeman's reasonable suspicion to stop the
vehicle's driver and investigate suspected unlawful possession of a gun. 5
Suspected illegal activities that support a reasonable suspicion to
stop a vehicle range from minor traffic offenses to felonies. 8 A driver's
actions may give police reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle for a
suspected minor traffic offense. 7 Driver actions constituting reasonable
suspicion for police to stop a vehicle have included failure to signal a
turn,- erratic driving,39 and speeding." Seemingly legal driver actions
also have constituted reasonable suspicion.41 For example, one court
found that police had a reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle because a
driver did not look at an officer while passing the patrol car, the driver
did not stop to talk to the officer, and the shabbily dressed driver was in
a "real nice car."
Id. at 147.
u Id. at 148.
Id. at 147-49.
See infra text accompanying notes 37-60 (discussion of suspected illegal activities
supporting an officer's reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle).
I See infra text accompanying notes 38-42 (driver's actions constituting reasonable
suspicion to stop vehicle for traffic offenses); see also Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364,
365 (1964) (men seated for several hours in parked car and giving evasive answers when
questioned by police supplied officers with reasonable suspicion to investigate possible
vagrancy violation); Duncantell v. Texas, 563 S.W.2d 252, 254-56 (Tex. 1978) (driver pro-
ceeding slowly with automobile lights off, then speeding with lights on, established
reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1032 (1978)
See Michigan v. Thomas, 456 U.S. - , 102 S. Ct. 3079, 3080 (1982) (per curiam)
(driver's failure to signal left turn established reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle).
I See United States v. Schmidt, 662 F.2d 498, 501, 504 (8th Cir. 1981) (erratic driving,
furtive behavior, and subsequent loading of objects into truck established reasonable suspi-
cion to stop vehicle).
'0 See United States v. Haley, 669 F.2d 201,202 (4th Cir. 1982) (excessive speed of vehicle
established reasonable suspicion to stop automobile for speeding), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W.
3973,3975 (June 15, 1982). The patrolman in Haley stated that he stopped a vehicle because he
observed the speeding vehicle bearing out-of-state license plates. 669 F.2d at 202. The Fourth
Circuit, however, did not mention the out-of-state plates when determining that the trooper
reasonably stopped the speeding vehicle. Id. at 203-04.
" See North Carolina v. Fox, No. 8126SC1367, slip op. at - (N.C. Ct. App., Sept. 7,
1982) (driver's shabby dress, late-model car, failure to ask directions, and avoidance of
officer's gaze established reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle).
42 Id. at -. In Fox, a policeman at 12:50 a.m. watched a late-modeled Chevrolet pro-
ceed slowly down a dead-end street surrounded by businesses. Id. at _. The officer stated
that several break-ins recently had occurred in the area. Id. at - The officer said that as
1983]
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Suspected vehicle equipment or registration requirement violations
also may constitute a reasonable suspicion for an officer to stop a vehi-
cle." Police legitimately have stopped vehicles for a broken side mirror,"
burned out headlights and license plate lights," expired license plates,4"
and improper license plates."' Police also validly have stopped a vehicle
because of a reasonable suspicion that a driver may have been driving
with a revoked license.48
In addition to minor traffic offenses or equipment violations,
suspected major crimes that have supported a reasonable suspicion to
stop a vehicle include smuggling illegal aliens,49 transporting drugs,' and
transporting illegal firearms."1 Informants' tips that a described vehicle
the vehicle turned and proceeded out of the dead-end, the driver "cocked" his head away
from the officer to avoid the policeman's gaze. Id. at __. The officer said that the driver did
not "fit the area" because the driver was shabbily dressed and had forty or fifty shoulder-
length braids. Id. at -. The officer did not observe any traffic or equipment violations. Id.
at . After stopping the driver, however, the policeman found that the driver did not have
a drivers' license, was driving a stolen car, and was an escaped prisoner. Id. at -.
43 See infra notes 44-48 (discussion of equipment violations constituting reasonable
suspicion to stop vehicle).
" See United States v. Cleary, 656 F.2d 1302, 1302-03 (9th Cir. 1981) (broken side mirror
on van established reasonable suspicion for police to stop vehicle for safety equipment viola-
tion), vacated on other grounds, 456 U.S. __, 102 S.Ct. 2919 (1982).
4' See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 220 (1973) (burned out headlight and
license plate light established reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle for traffic violation).
41 See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 107 (1977) (expired license plate provided
reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle for registration violation).
41 See United States v. Matthews, 615 F.2d 1279, 1281 (10th Cir. 1980 (civilian vehicle
bearing military license plates established reasonable suspicion to stop for improper use of
government property).
,' See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 213, 220 (1973) (earlier check by officer pro-
vided reasonable suspicion to believe driver was operating vehicle with revoked license).
49 See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 414-15, 421-22 (1981) (vehicle's large size,
direction of travel, and time of trip near the border established reasonable suspicion to stop
truck to investigate for suspected smuggling of illegal aliens).
' See United States v. Schmidt, 662 F.2d 498, 501, 504 (8th Cir. 1981) (informant's tip
and police observation of individual loading unidentified objects into truck established
reasonable suspicion to stop truck for trafficking marijuana); United States v. Watkins, 662
F.2d 1090, 1094, 1096 (4th Cir. 1981) (police officers' hearing sound of marijuana bales loaded
into tractor-trailer, observing vessel and vehicles entering and leaving property of con-
victed smuggler, and knowledge of immediate customs search of departing vessel provided
reasonable suspicion to stop van and tractor-trailer for transporting marijuana); United
States v. White, 648 F.2d 29, 30-32, 42-43 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (anonymous tip giving detailed in-
formation verified by officer's surveillance established reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle
for ongoing drug trafficking); United States v. Vargas, 643 F.2d 296, 297-98 (5th Cir. 1981)
(per curiam) (reliable information that vessel carried narcotics, police observation of men
hurrying toward vehicle near dock, and men's difficulty in bending to enter vehicle
established reasonable suspicion that the vehicle's occupants carried narcotics).
"' See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144-45 (1972) (informant's tip verified by of-
ficer's observation established reasonable suspicion that vehicle's driver was carrying
weapon); United States v. Moschetta, 646 F.2d 955, 957 (5th Cir. 1981) (informant's tip that
individual would be leaving from particular address with firearms and silencers in briefcase,
[Vol. 40:361
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contains counterfeit money52 or a passenger being held against his will
have provided police with reasonable suspicion to make a valid in-
vestigatory stop to question a vehicle's driver.53 Information that a vehi-
cle contains fleeing felons, such as escaping prisoners or armed robbers,
also provides police with reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle and in-
vestigate.' Police observation of illegal activity or evidence of a crime,
as well as an informant's description of a particular vehicle involved in il-
legal activity, can provide a reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle.5
After police legitimately stop a vehicle upon reasonable suspicion, safety
considerations justify an officer's ordering the vehicle's occupants out of
the car.'
Police do not need reasonable suspicion to stop vehicles in certain
circumstances. 7 Police at a road block can stop vehicles without
reasonable suspicion if the officers stop every vehicle or a certain
numbered pattern of vehicles that pass the road block. 8 For example,
police could stop six vehicles in a row, permit the next six vehicles pass-
ing the road block to proceed, then stop the next six vehicles.59 Police at
along with police observation of suspected individual, established reasonable suspicion to
stop vehicle individual was driving), cert. denied, 456 U.S. __ , 102 S. Ct. 2919 (1982).
1 See United States v. Combs, 672 F.2d 574, 575-77 (6th Cir. 1982) (informant's tip pro-
vided reasonable suspicion to stop van to question occupants about counterfeit money).
" See United States v. Hart, 656 F.2d 595, 596-98 (10th Cir. 1981) (informant's tip that
driver of camper was holding woman against her will, along with police surveillance of
driver's suspicious actions, established reasonable suspicion to stop camper to investigate).
I See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 130 (1978) (police radio call describing armed rob-
bery getaway car established reasonable suspicion for officer to stop similar vehicle); Virgin
Islands v. Rasool, 657 F.2d 582, 584-85 (3d Cir. 1981) (information that vehicle in which
prisoner escaped seen by fellow officer established reasonable suspicion for another officer
to stop vehicle).
I See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. __ , 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2160, 2168 n.22, 2172
(1982) (police observation of circumstances verifying informant's description of individual
selling narcotics from vehicle on particular street established suspicion to stop vehicle for
drug trafficking); see also supra notes 3 & 5 (discussion of Ross).
" See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109, 111 n.6 (1977). In Mimms, the
Supreme Court held that a policeman's order for occupants to get out of a vehicle was a
minor intrusion of an individual's rights. Id. at 111. The Court stated that once police
legitimately stop a vehicle, police can order occupants to step out of the vehicle and stand
on the side of the road. Id. The Mimms Court further stated that permitting officers to
make occupants step out of the vehicle and stand on the side of the road reduces the hazard
of accidental injury to an officer from traffic passing by the stopped vehicle. Id. at 109-11.
5' See infra text accompanying notes 58-60 (discussion of when police do not need
reasonable suspicion to stop vehicles passing roadblock).
" See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979). In Prouse, the Supreme Court
stated that although random checks of drivers for a vehicle's registration or for a driver's
license were unreasonable, police reasonably could check all drivers and vehicles. Id. at 663.
The Court emphasized that the alternative practice of stopping all drivers and vehicles
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a road block, however, need a reasonable suspicion to stop vehicles ran-
domly."
Although only a reasonable suspicion usually is necessary for police
to make a legitimate stop of a vehicle, probable cause usually is
necessary for police to make a valid warrantless search of the vehicle."
Probable cause requires an officer to have personal knowledge of facts
and circumstances from reasonably trustworthy information that is suf-
ficient for a man of reasonable caution to believe that a crime is being
committed or has been committed.2 An officer's personal knowledge of
suspected crime may come from personal observation, another
policeman's observations,63 or a reliable informant's tip verified by police
observation of illegal acts.'
Id. at 653-63. In Delaware v. Prouse, the Supreme Court held that stopping an
automobile and detaining the driver to check his driver's license and registration is
unreasonable unless a police officer has at least a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the
driver is unlicensed or that an occupant of the car is otherwise subject to seizure for
violating the law. Id.
See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) (probable cause is
necessary for officers to make warrantless vehicle search).
2 Id. In Brinegar, the Supreme Court determined that a previous search of an in-
dividual's vehicle for liquor, together with a federal agent's observation of the individual
loading liquor into the automobile and knowledge of the individual's reputation for hauling
liquor, constituted probable cause for federal agents to search the individual's vehicle. Id. at
165-72.
" See United States v. Laughman, 618 F.2d 1067, 1072-73 (4th Cir. 1980). In Laughman,
the Fourth Circuit held that as long as an officer ordering a search has knowledge of facts
establishing probable cause to search a vehicle, officers conducting the search do not have
to know the facts. Id. at 1072; see also Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 253 (1938) (of-
ficer's observation of illegal liquor established probable cause to search vehicle); United
States v. Hirschorn, 649 F.2d 360, 365 (5th Cir. 1981) (officer's surveillance of wagering ac-
tivities and evidence established probable cause to search vehicle); United States v. Ortega,
644 F.2d 512, 513-15 (5th Cir. 1981) (police surveillance of vessels suspected of transporting
contraband established probable cause to search vessel).
" See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. __, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2160 (1982) (informant's
tip that individual was selling drugs from car, verified by patrolman's check, established
probable cause to search for narcotics); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 755 (1979) (infor-
mant's tip that individual arriving at airport would be carrying suitcase containing mari-
juana and police observation established probable cause to believe particular individual was
transporting marijuana); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144-45 (1972) (informant's tip that
driver carried gun and contraband, verified by officer's grabbing gun, established probable
cause to search vehicle for contraband). Generally, courts upholding an informant's tip and
police observation as establishing probable cause emphasize that police observation
outweighs the informant's tip as a basis for probable cause. See Scher v. United States, 305
U.S. 251, 254 (1938) (police observation of reported circumstances is more important than ac-
tual informant's tip to establish probable cause to search vehicle); United States v.
Hirschhorn 649 F. 2d 360, 363 (5th Cir. 1981) (unknown informant's tip about wagering ac-
tivities verified by police surveillance to established probable cause to search vehicle). Con-
traband in plain view also may reinforce an informant's tip to establish probable cause to
search a vehicle. See United States v. Schmidt, 662 F.2d 498, 502-04 (10th Cir. 1981) (infor-
mant's tip insufficient to establish probable cause for house search, but tip plus plain view of
contraband sufficient to establish probable cause to search truck near house).
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Informants' tips supported by police observations have provided
probable cause to search a vehicle suspected of transporting narcotics, 5
firearms," or liquor." Courts generally permit an informant's tip to pro-
vide probable cause only when police surveillance substantiates the in-
formation of suspected crime," and the tip is reliable and supported by
underlying circumstances. 9 For example, in Aguilar v. Texas,7 0 police
relied upon information from an unnamed informant to obtain a warrant
to search an individual's house for narcotics.1 The police did not set up
surveillance to verify the informant's tip.72 The Aguilar Court found the
search warrant invalid. 7 The Court held that in determining an infor-
mant's reliability, an officer must have specific facts to support a conclu-
sion that the informant is telling the truth and that the informant obtain-
ed the information in a reliable manner.74
In Adams v. Williams,75 the Supreme Court, however, took a lenient
view regarding an informant's reliability to provide police with probable
cause for a warrantless vehicle search. 7 The Adams Court stated that an
I See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. __, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2160 (1982) (informant's
tip that particular individual conducted ongoing drug trafficking from specific vehicle, sup-
ported by police surveillance of individual and vehicle, established probable cause to search
vehicle); United States v. Ortega, 644 F.2d 512, 513-15 (5th Cir. 1981) (informant's tip that
vessel transporting contraband, supported by police surveillance, established probable
cause).
" See United States v. Moschetta, 646 F.2d 955, 956-59 (5th Cir. 1981) (informant's tip
that individual carried firearms and silencers in briefcase, supported by police surveillance,
established probable cause to search vehicle and briefcase), cert. denied, 456 U.S. ..
102 S. Ct. 1613 (1982); see also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147-49 (1972) (informant's tip
concerning weapons and narcotics, suspicious circumstances, and officer's verification that
individual carried gun established probable cause to search vehicle).
See Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 253 (1938) (informant's tip plus police
surveillance of vehicle transporting illegal liquor, established probable cause to search
vehicle).
" See text accompanying notes 65-80 (courts allowing informant's tip to supply prob-
able cause may also require police surveillance to support information of suspected crime).
"' See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964). In Aguilar, the Supreme Court held
that when a police officer uses an informant's tip as a basis for probable cause for an af-
fidavit to obtain a search warrant, the officer must show underlying circumstances support-
ing the validity of the information and the reliability of the informant. Id.; see Spinelli v.
United States, 393 U.S. 410, 415-18 (1969). In Spinelli, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
Aguilar standard for permitting an informant's tip to establish probable cause. Id. at 415-16.
The Spinelli Court explained that only the probability of criminal activity, not a prima facie
showing of criminal activity, is the standard for establishing probable cause. Id. at 419.
70 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
Id. at 109-10
Id. at 109 n.1.
Id. at 115-16.
Id. at 113-15.
75 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
76 See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. at 147 (reliability of informants' tips to establish
probable cause may vary according to circumstances).
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informant's tip may vary in reliability in different circumstances.77 The
Court held that a policeman had probable cause to arrest and search a
vehicle's driver because the policeman found that the driver had a
revolver in his belt where an informant had said the weapon would be.78
The Adams Court further held that the officer's discovery of the gun cor-
roborated the reliability of the informant's report that the vehicle con-
tained narcotics. 9
Courts have explained that in establishing probable cause, police
observance of an illegal activity is more important than an informant's
tip about the activity.0 Police observance is a direct source of informa-
tion, but an informant's tip is not. An officer's past observation of
criminal activities"1 or an officer's unsupported belief of present criminal
activities, however, are alone insufficient to establish probable cause for
a warrantless vehicle search.2 Actual practical and factual considera-
tions at the time of the search must support an officer's knowledge of
suspected criminal activity to establish sufficient probable cause to
search a vehicle without a warrant. 3 For example, an officer's observa-
Id. at 147. In Adams, the Supreme Court found that an unverified informant's tip by
itself may not be sufficient to establish probable cause to search. Id. The Court stated that
once police corroborate the informant's reliability and consider surrounding circumstances,
however, probable cause can exist to search or arrest. Id. The Adams Court also stated that
police do not have to show the specific evidence necessary to support each element of an of-
fense for conviction when establishing probable cause. Id. at 149.
78 Id. at 148.
I' !d.
See Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 253-55 (1938) (although police had infor-
mant's tip, officers' observance of illegal liquor in vehicle established valid grounds for war-
rantless search of vehicle); United States v. Hirschhorn, 649 F.2d 360, 363, 365 (5th Cir.
1981) (unknown informant's tip supported by police surveillance established probable cause
to search vehicle for evidence of illegal wagering).
" See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 99-104 (1959) (officer's past observation of
criminal activity insufficient to establish probable cause for present search). In Henry, the
Supreme Court would not allow an officer's earlier observation of stolen radio shipments to
establish probable cause to search a vehicle. Id. at 99-104. The Henry Court held that
previous surveillance was not a reasonable ground to justify an officer's present belief that
the packages observed in a vehicle also contained stolen radios. Id. at 103-04. Similarly, in
Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., the Supreme Court held that an officer's observation of
a bullet hole in the side of an automobile was insufficient to establish probable cause to
search the vehicle. See 391 U.S. 216, 220-21 (1968). The Dyke Court explained that because
police did not know that someone had fired shots at the car, the bullet hole was insufficient
to justify officers' beliefs that they would find evidence of an earlier shooting in a vehicle
stopped for speeding and reckless driving. Id. at 218, 220-22.
' See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) (officer must have
knowledge of facts and circumstances reasonably supporting belief of criminal activity to
establish probable cause for search); United States v. Bush, 647 F.2d 357, 362-65 (3d Cir.
1981) (officer's belief must have corroboration from reliable facts, circumstances, and infor-
mation).
" See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148-49 (1972) (court evaluates facts and cir-
cumstances at time of search to determine whether police had probable cause to act);
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) (probable cause determination depends
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tion of a driver's actions, such as erratic driving, slurred speech, or ef-
forts to flee, can provide probable cause to search a vehicle for alcohol or
narcotics." Police surveillance of persons loading suspected contraband
into a vehicle also provides probable cause to search the vehicle for li-
quor," gambling paraphernalia," or drugs.
8
Once an informant's tip and police surveillance establish probable
cause, exigent circumstances can permit a search without a warrant.'
The Supreme Court has allowed exigent circumstances to justify a war-
rantless search when delay in obtaining a warrant could endanger.police
officers or the public, or would result in loss or destruction of evidence.
For exigent circumstances to permit a warrantless search, the need for
an officer to make a warrantless search must be readily apparent." A
vehicle's mobility generally provides an exigent circumstance to permit
a warrantless search.' Other exigencies that permit a warrantless vehi-
cle search include an officer's knowledge that chemicals stored in a
mobile home could explode92 or that a man in a camper is holding a
woman against her will. 3 Danger to the public and to police officers is an
upon probabilities from the facts and circumstances under which a reasonable, prudent man
would act).
" See Duncantell v. Texas, 563 S.W.2d 252,254-55 (Tex. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1032
(1978). InDuncantell, the Texas Supreme Court held that police had probable cause to search a
vehicle for narcotics and alcohol because of the driver's bizaare actions. 563 S.W.2d at 255.
Police observed an automobile proceeding slowly without lights, then abruptly speeding with
the lights on. Id. at 254. When police stopped the driver for speeding, he became angry and
abusive, hit an officer, and tried to flee in the vehicle. Id. The driver appeared intoxicated
and talked in slurred speech. Id. at 255. The Texas Supreme Court held that the driver's ac-
tions justified the police officers' beliefs that the vehicle contained alcohol or narcotics. Id.
' See Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 253 (1938) (probable cause established by
police observation of liquor being loaded into vehicle).
" See United States v. Hirschhorn, 649 F.2d 360, 365 (5th Cir. 1981) (probable cause
established by police observation of gambling evidence in vehicle).
" See United States v. Ortega, 644 F.2d 512, 513-15 (5th Cir. 1981) (probable cause pro-
vided by police observation of contraband being loaded onto vessel).
" See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759-60 (1979). In Sanders, the Supreme Court
explained that exigent circumstances are those requiring an officer to act immediately to in-
sure his or the public's safety, or to prevent the destruction of evidence. Id. at 759-60.
9Id.
"Id. at 763. The Supreme Court measures exigent circumstances immediately before
a search. Id. Once circumstances creating an exigency are over, a warrantless search
becomes unreasonable. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 63-65 (1968) (exigent cir-
cumstances do not exist without reasonable grounds to believe officer in danger); Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 )1968) (reasonableness of officer's intrusion depends upon whether ex-
igent circumstances existed at time officer interferes with individual); Preston v. United
States, 376 U.S. 364, 367-68 (1964) (exigent circumstances do not exist when search is too
remote in time to be incident to arrest).
" See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (vehicle's inherent mobility
estabished exigent circumstances to permit warrantless search).
' See United States v. Brock, 667 F.2d 1311, 1317-18 (9th Cir. 1982) (need for search
readily apparent because officers aware that motor home contained explosive chemicals).
" See United States v. Hart, 656 F.2d 595, 596-600 (10th Cir. 1981) (exigent cir-
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exigent circumstance that permits a warrantless vehicle search for
weapons when police observe the vehicle's occupants repeatedly looking
at a bank through binoculars. 4 Exigent circumstances, combined with
the discovery of contraband, instrumentalities, or fruits of a crime in
plain view also support a warrantless search of a vehicle to prevent the
destruction of evidence. 5
Once police legitimately have stopped a vehicle, contraband in plain
view can establish probable cause96 and the vehicle's mobility provides
exigent circumstances to permit a warrantless search of the vehicle. 7 In
Coolidge v. New Hampshire," the Supreme Court held that police may
conduct a warrantless search and seizure when they are legitimately on
the premises, inadvertently discover evidence of crime, and discover
evidence in plain view." In Colorado v. Bannister,' the Court held,
however, that because evidence of a crime was in plain view, police had
cumstances existed because of officer's fear that vehicle's driver threatened woman's safety
by holding her against her will in camper).
. See United States v. Sears, 663 F.2d 896, 903 (9th Cir. 1981) (exigent circumstances
created by threat to public safety when officers observed individuals in automobile with
out-of-state tags repeatedly surveying bank through binoculars), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct.
1731 (1982).
" See United States v. Watkins, 662 F.2d 1090, 1096 (4th Cir. 1981) (exigent cir-
cumstance of mobility plus plain view of marijuana on tractor-trailer bumper permitted war-
rantless search of vehicle for contraband), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1613 (1982).
" See infra notes 98-111 (discussion of contraband in plain view establishing probable
cause to search a vehicle).
" See supra text accompanying notes 88-95 (exigent circumstances permit a war-
rantless search once police have probable cause).
" 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
Id. at 464-73. In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, the Supreme Court held that police
may conduct a warrantless search and seizure when they are legitimately on the premises,
inadvertently discover evidence of crime, and observe evidence in plain view. 403 U.S. at
464-73. There are two types of plain view situations, search plain view and nonsearch plain
view. See 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.2, at 242-48 (1978). Search plain view oc-
curs when police are legitimately on the premises where they are conducting a search. Id.;
see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466, 468-69 (discussion of inadvertent
discovery of evidence in plain view after police make lawful intrusion). Nonsearch plain
view occurs when an officer observes evidence without first having made a lawful intrusion
to search a vehicle. LAVAVE, supra at 242-48. A nonsearch plain view discovery requires
that an officer face exigent circumstances before proceeding with a warrantless search. Id.;
see Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 235-36 (1968) (per curiam). In Harris, a policeman
made a nonsearch discovery of a robbery victim's vehicle registration card in plain view on
the front door rim of a vehicle in protective custody. Id. at 235. The officer was about to lock
the car as required by impoundment regulations when he discovered the registration card.
Id. The Supreme Court held that the policeman's discovery of the registration card was not
the result of a vehicle search, but of a required procedure to protect an impounded vehicle
from vandals. Id. at 236. The Harris Court reaffirmed that police legitimately may seize
evidence falling into plain view when an officer has a right to be in the position to have that
view. Id.; see Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 42-43 (1963) (valid discovery of marijuana in
plain view because police legitimately were on premises to arrest Ker, and Ker's wife could
have destroyed marijuana).
S 449 U.S. 1 (1980).
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probable cause to make a warrantless seizure of evidence found in a
vehicle.'' In Bannister, a police officer heard a radio report of the theft
of specific items from an auto parts store and later spotted an auto-
mobile fitting the description of the robbers' vehicle.' The officer ap-
proached the parked vehicle, and observed stolen lug nuts in an open com-
partment between the vehicle's bucket seats, and stolen lug wrenches on
the back floorboard.' The vehicle's occupants also met the description
of individuals suspected of the robbery."4 The Bannister Court held that
evidence in plain view, as well as suspected robbers occupying the vehi-
cle, gave the officer probable cause to seize the evidence without a war-
rant."'
In addition to making a valid warrantless seizure of evidence in plain
view, police have conducted a valid warrantless vehicle search after
spotting contraband, such as marijuana, in plain view on a vehicle's
bumper."' In other plain view situations, an officer's smelling contra-
band," or a trained dog's sniffing contraband,"' can provide probable
101 See Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1, 2-4 (1980) (officer's observation of suspected
stolen lug nuts on seat of vehicle stopped for speeding establishing probable cause to search
vehicle for evidence from auto parts store theft).
Id. at 2.
103 Id. at 4
104 Id.
105 Id.
"04 See United States v. Watkins, 662 F.2d 1090, 1096 (4th Cir. 1981). In Watkins, police
stopped a tractor-trailer truck suspected of transporting contraband. Id. at 1094. An officer
found marijuana residue on the vehicle's bumper, opened the rear doors, and found mari-
juana bales. Id. The Fourth Circuit determined that the officer's discovery of marijuana
residue in plain view on the tractor-trailer bumper, gave policemen probable cause to search
the vehicle for contraband. Id. at 1096.
"I? See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948) (opium odor sufficient to provide
probable cause to search motel room); Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1, 6 (1932) (narcotics
odor reliable indicator of possible crime); United States v. Haley, 669 F.2d 201, 203-04 (4th
Cir. 1982) (marijuana odor sufficient to provide probable cause to search vehicle for contra-
band), cert. denied 456 U.S. __, 102 S. Ct. 2928 (1982); see also Virgin Islands v. Rasool,
657 F.2d 582, 586-87 (3d Cir. 1981) (smell of gun powder and sight of gun on seat established
probable cause to search vehicle).
I"4 See United States v. Waltzer, 51 U.S.L.W. 2081, 2084 (2d Cir., Aug. 10, 1982). In
Waltzer, the Second Circuit held that a trained drug-detecting dog with a proven record of
reliability can establish probable cause to arrest a person possessing luggage for possession
of contraband. Id. at 2084. The Waltzer Court held that the dog's sniffing did not constitute
a search of the luggage. Id; see United States v. Viera, 644 F.2d 509, 511-12 (5th Cir. 1981)
(trained drug-detecting dog's reliable success rate for sniffing contraband established prob-
able cause to search luggage for contraband), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 867 (1981); Buck v. State,
77 Okla. Cr. 17, __ , 138 P.2d 115, 119-22 (1943) (bloodhound's training and experience
considered when court determines dog's reliability to track down scent). But see People v.
Williams, 51 Cal. App. 3d 346, 348-51, 124 Cal. Rptr. 253, 254-55 (1975). In Williams, a
California appeals court held that police without probable cause could not enter an airline's
restricted luggage area with a trained dog to use the dog's sense of smell to establish prob-
able cause to search a suitcase for marijuana. 51 Cal. App. 3rd at 350; 124 Cal. Rptr. at 255.
See generally LAFAvE, supra note 99, § 2.2(f) (discussion of use of trained canine to establish
probable cause).
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cause to support an officer's belief of criminal activity.0 9 Courts,
however, have not extended the plain view doctrine to permit an
officer's sense of touch to establish probable cause by the plain feel of
evidence in a container." '
Once police have probable cause to make a warrantless vehicle
search, the search may occur at the scene of the stop or at the station
house."' Certain situations, however, permit police to conduct war-
rantless vehicle searches without probable cause whether the search oc-
curs at the scene of the stop or at the station house."' When an in-
dividual consents to an officer's request to search a vehicle, police can
make a warrantless vehicle search without probable cause." 3 Valid con-
sent to make a warrantless vehicle search can come from a driver,"' a
passenger,"5 a vehicle's rental agent,"6 a suspect's spouse who jointly
owns the vehicle,"7 or the owner of a container inside the vehicle."8
10 See supra notes 107-08 (discussion of individual's or dog's sense of smell to establish
probable cause to search for contraband).
11o See Leake v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 937, 265 S.E.2d 701 (1980). In Leake, the
Supreme Court of Virginia held that an officer's grasping and shaking a bag of marijuana
constituted a warrantless search. Id. at 942, 265 S.E.2d at 704. The court also held that the
grabbing search was unreasonable because the search was without an exception to the war-
rant requirement. Id. at 942, 265 S.E.2d at 704. In Leake, the officers admitted that they had
no probable cause to believe the bag contained contraband. Id. at 939, 265 S.E.2d at 703. See
LAFAVE, supra note 99, at 46-47 (Supp. 1982) (rejecting idea of plain touch doctrine allowing
examination of containers in all circumstances).
"' See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970) (if vehicle search valid at scene of
stop, then police also can search vehicle at station house); Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67, 68
(1975) (probable cause to search vehicle valid at both scene of stop and later at station house)
(per curiam); United States v. Haley, 669 F.2d 201, 203-04 (4th Cir. 1982) (probable cause to
believe vehicle transporting marijuana supports search on highway or at police station).
112 See infra text accompanying notes 113-132 (discussion of circumstances permitting
warrantless vehicle searches without probable cause).
113 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 221-22 (1973). In Schneckloth, the
Supreme Court stated that in order for police to make a valid warrantless search of a vehi-
cle pursuant to an individual's consent, the consent must be voluntary and cannot result
from durress or coercion whether express or implied. Id. at 248; see United States v. Wat-
son, 423 U.S. 411, 412, 424-25 (1976) (upholding warrantless automobile search after owner
gave voluntary consent to search).
When an individual engages in a highly regulated business, implied consent acts as an
exception to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement. See United States v. Biswell,
406 U.S. 311, 316-17 (1972) (valid warrantless inspection of firearms dealership); Wyman v.
James, 400 U.S. 309, 318-24 (1971) (valid warrantless inspection of welfare recipient's home).
"' See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 412, 424 (1976) (valid warrantless
automobile search after voluntry consent of driver).
"I See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 220-21, 223-49 (1973) (passenger can
give voluntary consent for police to search vehicle).
.. See United States v. Martin, 636 F.2d 974, 976-78 (5th Cir. 1981) (rental agent can
give valid consent for police to search vehicle fitting robbery getaway vehicle description),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 917 (1981).
,17 See United States v. Baldwin, 644 F.2d 381, 383 (5th Cir. 1981) (wife can give valid
consent for police to search vehicle jointly owned by husband and wife).
11. See United States v. Combs, 672 F.2d 574, 577-78 (6th Cir. 1982) (owner gave valid
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Similarly, a warrantless vehicle search also is permissible incident to the
arrest of a vehicle's occupants."'
Police do not need probable cause to make a warrantless vehicle
search when an officer makes a search incident to arrest.'2 ; In New York
v. Belton,"' the Supreme Court held that in a search incident to a lawful
custodial arrest, police can search the passenger compartrment of a vehi-
cle, as well as containers found in the passenger coml'artment." In
Belton, police arrested four men for possession of marijuana, then search-
ed an envelope of marijuana and a jacket containing cocaine found inside
the vehicle." The Court held that police legitimately searched the jacket
and the envelope incident to the arrest because both items were in the
passenger compartment and were within the arrestee's immediate con-
trol.'24 The Court explained that protecting evidence and the officer's
safety justified permitting the officer to search the area within the ar-
restee's control." The Belton Court further held that once an officer
establishes sufficient probable cause to arrest an individual, the officer
can make a search of a vehicle's passenger compartment, including con-
tainers inside the vehicle, incident to arrest. 2 "
The Supreme Court has allowed other types of warrantless vehicle
searches." Police can search vehicles or vessels crossing national boun-
daries without probable cause because of national safety and health con-
siderations." The Court also has permitted a warrantless vehicle search
consent for police to search her purse for counterfeit money), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 3495
(1982).
"' See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 457-59 (1981) (search of container found in car
after individual arrested upheld); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 222-23 (1973)
(justification for arrest also justified search of cigarette package inside driver's pocket
because package within arrestee's control); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 149 (1972)
(search incident to arrest reasonably allows limited intrusion from search of individual for
officer's safety because officer had sufficient probable cause to arrest); Hill v. California, 401
U.S. 797, 802-04 (1971) (although police arrdsted wrong person, vehicle search incident to ar-
rest allowed).
"l See infra text accompanying notes 121-126 (discussion of search incident to arrest).
,2' 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
1" Id. at 460-61, 461 n.4. In New York v. Belton, the Supreme Court permitted police to
search a vehicle's passenger compartment and containers after arresting an individual
because the passenger compartment was within the arrestee's control right before the ar-
rest. Id. at 460-61. The Belton Court stated that police must be able to search the area with-
in an arrestee's control to prevent the arrestee's use of a weapon or destruction of evidence.
Id. at 457-58. The Belton Court did not include a vehicle's trunk as an area within the ar-
restee's control. Id. at 460 n.4.
'5 Id. at 455-56.
Id. at 462-63.
12 Id. at 460-61
125 Id.
'" See infra text accompanying notes 128-32 (warrantless vehicle searches valid at
border or when vehicle in police custody).
' See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 268-73 (1973) (establishing
border search exception to fourth amendment's warrant requirement); see supra note 10
(discussion of exceptions to fourth amendment's warrant requirement).
19831
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
without probable cause when a vehicle is in police custody in order to
protect the owner's property, to protect the police against claims for
stolen property, to protect police and the public from potentially
dangerous weapons stored inside a vehicle, and to determine whether a
vehicle is stolen." Ways that a vehicle may come into police custody in-
clude arrest of the vehicle's occupants,13 impoundment of the vehicle due
to involvement in a crime or accident,"' and forfeiture proceedings
under criminal or tax statutes.2
Regardless of circumstances supporting warrantless searches, police
actions may taint an otherwise valid warrantless search and cause
courts to exclude evidence obtained during the search." Justifications
for excluding evidence when police act improperly include deterring fur-
ther police misconduct and precluding the government from benefitting
from illegally obtained evidence.'34 In United States v. Dunn,3 ' Federal
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents without a warrant trespassed
on Dunn's ranch, detected a strong chemical odor, and investigated the
contents of two barns. 8 Although in one barn the agents observed only
empty chemical boxes, they discovered chemicals and laboratory equip-
" See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976) (discussion of justifications
for permitting police to make warrantless vehicle search without probable cause when ve-
hicle in police custody). In Opperman, Court held that when police lawfully impound or seize
a vehicle, police may conduct a warrantless search to inventory the vehicle's contents. Id. at
375-76. The Court found that policeman conducted a valid warrantless search of the impounded
vehicle's interior and glove compartment. Id.; see Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433,448 (1973)
(valid warrantless search of trunk of vehicle seized by police following accident); supra note 10
(discussion of exceptions to fourth amendment's warrant requirement).
13 See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 442-43 (1973) (valid inventory search of ve-
hicle in police custody after driver arrested following accident); Cooper v. California, 386
U.S. 58, 62 (1967) (valid inventory search at police station following driver's arrest for nar-
cotics charges).
" See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 591-93 (1974) (valid search of vehicle after ve-
hicle impounded as evidence of murder); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 448 (1973) (valid
search of car in police custody after driver arrested following accident); Cooper v. Califor-
nia, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967) (valid arrest for narcotics charges).
3 See General Motors Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 344-45 (1977) (valid
search of auto seized pursuant to jeopardy assessment by IRS); Cooper v. California, 386
U.S. at 58-59, 61-62 (1967) (valid search of vehicle impounded under forfeiture proceedings
for narcotics violations).
' See United States v. Dunn, 674 F.2d 1093, 1101 (5th Cir. 1982) (federal agents' post-
warrant conduct fatal to warrant because agents trespassed and delayed in obtaining war-
rant), petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3292 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1982) (No. 82-508); infra text
accompanying notes 135-44 (discussion of Dunn).
3 See United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 (1975) (discussion of justifications for
excluding evidence obtained by police misconduct); see also United States v. Cook, 657 F.2d
730, 733-36 (5th Cir. 1981) (search warrant invalidated because officer failed to give par-
ticular descriptions of items to be seized).
' 674 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1982).
1 Id. at 1096.
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ment in the other barn.'37 The agents made no attempt to seize the
chemicals during their warrantless searches of the barns, even though
the agents later claimed that exigent circumstances existed to allow the
searches."' The agents returned to Dunn's property while other agents
were obtaining a warrant. 39 Although the warrant affidavit claimed that
exigent circumstances existed because someone could destroy chemicals
easily, the agents again made no effort to seize the chemicals.4 The next
day agents returned to Dunn's ranch, searched the property, and seized
the chemicals.' The Fifth Circuit held in Dunn that although cir-
cumstances tended to bolster probable cause of criminal activity, the
DEA agents performed their duties illegally by trespassing.'' The Dunn
court found that the odor was of legal chemicals not yet processed into
contraband and that the agents failed to take swift action under contend-
ed exigent circumstances to prevent processing or destruction of the
chemicals.' The Fifth Circuit held that the agents' unconstitutional en-
try and investigation, as well as the officer's post-warrant conduct,
precluded admission of evidence seized during the final search.4
The Supreme Court has stated that policies underlying exclusion of
evidence require deterrence only when an officer has knowledge that his
action is unconstitutional. 5 Conversely, courts may admit invalidly seized
evidence because of an officer's good faith belief that he is conducting a
proper search and seizure.'48 Courts, however, have stated that when
considering "good faith" situations, a court should analyze carefully each
case individually.'47
137 d.
1I8 Id. at 1096-97, 1102.
,' Id. at 1097.
Id. at 1097 n.4.
" Id. at 1097-98.
' Id. at 1100-01.
1 Id. at 1102.
... Id. at 1102-03.
.. See United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 (1975). The Peltier Court stated that
the policies underlying exclusion of evidence require deterrence only when an officer has
knowledge that his action is unconstitutional. Id. at 542; see also Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443
U.S. 31, 37-38 (1979) (officer acted in good faith by stopping individual pursuant to city or-
dinance, even though officer did not know ordiance was unconstitutional).
1.. See United States v. Alvarez-Porras, 643 F.2d 54, 60-66 (2nd Cir. 1981) (evidence
from illegal warrantless search not excluded because agents proceeded with search in good
faith, but under mistaken belief, that search warrant already issued), cert denied, 454 U.S.
839 (1981).
"7 Id. at 60. Unconstitutionally seized evidence may be admissible at trial if the seizing
officer acted with the good faith belief that his conduct was constitutional and he had a
reasonable basis for the belief. See Michigan v. DeFilippo, 443 U.S. 31, 39-40 (1979) (drugs
found during search incident to arrest admissible even though city ordinance which authorized
arrest later declared unconstitutional). The Second Circuit in United States v. Alvarez-Porras,
however, warned against allowing an officer's good faith actions to become an exception for
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After Ross, police must meet three requirements to make a war-
rantless search of a vehicle and containers inside the vehicle.'48 First, an
officer must have a reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle.' Second, an
officer must have probable cause to search the vehicle and containers in-
side the vehicle."' Finally, police must be able to show that the vehicle or
containers inside the vehicle reasonably could contain the object of the
search."' Although Ross expanded the scope of a warrantless search of a
container found inside a vehicle, the Supreme Court limited the search of
a vehicle when police have probable cause to search only one container
inside the vehicle."' Under Ross, police must be able to articulate and
describe the object of a search and the place to be searched." For exam-
ple, police cannot claim that probable cause to believe a van transports
illegal aliens justifies a warrantless search of a suitcase found in the
van." Conversely, the Ross Court held that probable cause to believe a
suitcase in a vehicle contains contraband does not justify a warrantless
search of an entire vehicle."'
Police, prosecutors, and defense attorneys in warrantless auto-
mobile search cases now must consider how police articulate the facts
and circumstances giving rise to a reasonable suspicion to stop and pro-
bable cause to search."6 Since police must articulate the object of the
allowing unconstitutionally seized evidence to be admitted at trial when police conducted in-
valid warrantless searches. See 643 F.2d 54, 60 (2nd Cir. 1981) (warning against good faith
exception to fourth amendment's warrant requirement), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 839 (1981).
See generally Ball, Good Faith and the Fourth Amendment: The "Reasonable" Exception
to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 635 (1978) (discussion of whether
courts should adopt good faith exception to fourth amendment's warrant requirement);
Note, The Role of Police Officer Good Faith in Substantive Fourth Amendment Doctrine,
55 WASH. L. REV. 849 (1980) (discussion of whether courts' reliance on officers' good faith ac-
tions circumvents fourth amendment's warrant requirement and encroaches upon in-
dividual's substantive rights).
"' See supra text accompanying notes 1-16 (discussion of Ross prerequisites for valid
warrantless vehicle search).
149 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2159, 2172; see supra text accompanying notes 17-60 (discussion of
situations constituting reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle).
0 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2159, 2172; see supra text accompanying notes 61-111 (discussion of
probable cause necessary to search vehicle).
"' 102 S. Ct. at 2172. In Ross, the Supreme Court speculated that in a situation where
police would have probable cause to search a specific suitcase, officers could not extend the
search to an entire vehicle transporting the suitcase. Id. The Ross Court explained that the
object of the search defines the scope of the search. Id.
12 See United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1982) (limiting vehicle search when





11 See LATZER, supra note 15, at 402-05. Although police will have to define the object
of a search in order to make a valid warrantless container search, officers no longer have to
consider whether a particular container is protected from a warrantless search by the
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search,15 ' defense counsel should pinpoint whether at the time of the
search the vehicle or containers reasonably could contain the object for
which police searched."8 Defense counsel also should consider the
possibility that an object in a specific container inside a vehicle was the
articulated object of a policeman's search."9 For example, an individual
may place a briefcase containing contraband inside a vehicle's trunk.'60
The Ross Court specifically rejected the search of an entire vehicle when
the object sought is in a particular container. 6 '
After Ross, new considerations may appear as police, prosecutors,
and defense attorneys question the exact articulated object of each war-
rantless search of vehicles and containers. The requirements that police
must articulate the object of a search now supplants privacy expecta-
tions to prevent police from making a general search of vehicles or con-
tainers when the vehicle or container reasonably cannot contain the ob-
ject of a search."' For example, police searching for liquor or firearms
reasonably could not expect to find either item in a slightly flattened
envelope found inside a vehicle. Police, however, could feel the envelope
outside and ascertain that it contained a powdery or crystalized
substance by sliding the sides of the envelope over one another.'63 Under
Ross, police conducting a warrantless search for a container containing
liquor or firearms could not open the envelope without a warrant even
though they suspected that the envelope contained narcotics.' Ross,
owner's expectations of privacy that the container's contents will remain unexposed. 102 S.
Ct. at 2171-72; LATZER, supra at 402. Police still must obtain a warrant to search a container
not found inside a vehicle. 102 S. Ct. at 2172; LATZER, supra, at 402, 405. Police, however,
will not have to define the object of a container search when the container is inside a vehicle
and police have probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband. 102 S. Ct. at
2170-71.
102 S. Ct. at 2171-72.
I' !d.
"' Id. at 2179-82 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
I Id. at 2171-72.
161 Id.
Id. at 2177, 2180-82 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citizens' privacy outweighs need for
police intrusion to search for evidence); see LATZER, supra, note 15 at 403-05 (discussion of
whether Ross actually changes individual's right to privacy in automobiles); see also Fyfe,
Enforcement Workshop: Robbins, Belton and Ross- The Policeman's Lot Becomes a Hap-
pier One, 18 CRIM. L. BULL. 461, 466-67 (1982) (Ross broadens police search powers by waiv-
ing privacy consideratons).
"' See supra text accompanying note 110 (discussing idea of extension of plain view
doctrine to allow police to establish probable cause by plain feel). Although courts have not
established a plain feel doctrine, several courts have stated that an officer's feeling a con-
tainer can constitute a search. See United States v. Martin, 562 F.2d 673, 676 n.6 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (probing the bulge in suitcase side may constitute search); Hernandez v. United
States, 353 F.2d 624, 626 (9th Cir. 1965), (manipulation or squeezing of suitcase sides con-
stitutes search) cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1008 (1966); Leake v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 937, 942,
265 S.E.2d 701, 704 (1980) (grasping and shaking of paper bag constitutes search).
'" 102 S. Ct. at 2171-72.
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however, may encourage police to manufacture reasonable suspicion to
stop a vehicle and probable cause to search for objects found in con-
tainers inside a vehicle, after police already have conducted the search.165
ROBIN JACKSON ALLEN
" See Fyfe, supra note 163, at 466-67. Law enforcement officers may view Ross as
broadening the search powers of the police. Id. at 466. Ross may prove to be a signal to
police that under the automobile exception officers will not have to stop their searches of
automobiles to obtain a warrant at a point when they have ripped open upholstery or open-
ed compartments and containers. Id. at 466-67.
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